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1Abstract
We show that diﬀerences in investors risk aversion can generate herd be-
havior in stock markets where assets are traded sequentially. This in turn
prevents markets from being eﬃcient in the sense that ￿nancial market prices
do not converge to the asset￿s fundamental value. The informational eﬃ-
ciency of the market depends on the distribution of the risky asset across
risk averse agents. These results are obtained without introducing multidi-
mensional uncertainty.
21 Introduction
In this paper we study some causes of herd behavior in stock markets, and
its eﬀects on price formation and market informational eﬃciency.
In the ￿nancial market microstructure theory, it is generally accepted
that when trading occurs sequentially, agents gradually learn market funda-
mentals and, eventually, deviations between transaction prices and long-term
market fundamentals vanish. 1 This happens because at each trading round,
the investors￿ actions disclose, at least partially, their private information
on fundamentals. This information is incorporated into the trading prices.
Thus, by observing these prices, it is eventually possible to infer all the rele-
vant private information that is dispersed among investors. In other words,
in the long run, market is strong-form informational eﬃcient.
The theoretical literature on ￿herd behavior￿ challenges this result. Loosely
speaking, an investor engages in herd behavior when he imitates the action
of other investors. The literature on herding proves that sequential interac-
tion of rational investors can generate herd behavior and this prevents agents
from learning the market fundamentals.2
More precisely, an investor ￿herds￿ when he takes an action he would
not have taken had he not known that other investors have taken it. Thus,
when there is herd behavior, investors￿ actions do not depend on their own
private information, but only on other investors￿ past actions. Therefore,
in the presence of herding, investors￿ actions do not disclose any private
information on market fundamentals and consequently the social learning
process stops.
However, most of the theoretical results on herding are based on the as-
sumption that transaction prices are exogenously ￿xed and are not aﬀected
by the information provided by past trades. Therefore, the herding literature
cannot be directly applied to stock markets, where prices potentially change
at each trade, and it is clearly un￿t to study the issue of price informa-
tional eﬃciency. On the other hand, there are numerous empirical studies 3
that detect imitative, or herd behavior in ￿nancial markets, suggesting that
1See Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2001) for a complete review of the literature in mi-
crostructure theory.
2See Chamley (2001) for an extensive and complete study on the causes of rational
herding.
3See Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) for a survey on the theoretical and empirical
literature on herding.
3this is a common widespread phenomenon in ￿nancial markets. Still, the
standard ￿nancial market microstructure literature, where trading prices are
endogenous, does not explain the phenomenon of herding.
Thus, in order to understand the actual causes of imitative behavior
and its eﬀect on market informational eﬃciency, it is crucial to understand
whether the diﬀerent results provided by the microstructure models and the
herding models, follow from the assumption that prices are exogenous in the
￿rst case and endogenous in the latter.
In this paper we shall consider a ￿nancial market microstructure model
where trades occur sequentially and trading prices are endogenously deter-
mined at each trade. We show that a simple diﬀerence in the degree of risk
aversion between market makers and traders can generate history dependent
behavior including herding behavior. Moreover, we prove that these behav-
iors drastically reduces the long run informational eﬃciency of ￿nancial mar-
kets. This suggests that standard microstructure theory over-estimates the
markets informational eﬃciency and that the endogeneity of prices cannot,
in general, prevent herd behavior.
The relations between rational herding, prices formation and informa-
tional eﬃciency, have been also analyzed by Avery and Zemsky (1998) and
Lee (1998). Both these papers studied the occurrence of herding when trad-
ing is sequential and prices are endogenous.
In the sequential trade model from Avery and Zemsky (1998) (AZ hence-
forth), history dependent behavior follows from the presence of multidimen-
sional uncertainty.
Indeed, in the AZ model, the observation of the trading history only
assures that the agents in the economy learn about a single dimension of
uncertainty at one time. So, multidimensional uncertainty can induce mar-
ket makers and traders to interpret diﬀerently the histories of trades and, in
the short run, this can generate history dependent behavior and short run
mispricing. Nevertheless, in their model, the ￿ow of information to market
makers never stops4 as market makers continue to learn about at least one
of the dimensions of uncertainty. In brief, AZ show that multidimensional
uncertainty is necessary to generate short run herding behavior but, in the
long run, it cannot impede trading prices to eventually converge to the fun-
4Equivalently, using the terminology of AZ, an informational cascade cannot occur.
4damental value of the asset5.
Some of our ￿ndings are somewhat in contrast with AZ. Firstly, we show
that multidimensional uncertainty is not necessary to obtain herd or con-
trarian behavior6, unless market makers and traders are both risk neutral.
Namely, we prove that when market makers and traders have diﬀerent de-
grees of risk aversion, herd and contrarian behavior can occur even if there
is only one dimension of uncertainty. Generally speaking, the occurrence of
these behaviors in stock markets relies on the fact that the same history of
trade aﬀects diﬀerently market makers quotes and traders￿ valuations for the
asset. In the AZ model, market makers and traders react diﬀerently to the
same history because they interpret it in a diﬀerent way. By contrast, in our
model, traders and market makers interpret past histories in the same way.
H o w e v e r ,t h es a m ei n f o r m a t i o na ﬀects market makers￿ quotes and traders￿
valuations diﬀerently because they diﬀer in their risk aversion. This result,
combined with the observation that investors diﬀer in their aptitude toward
risk, provides a reasonable explanation of the widespread observation of his-
tory dependent behaviors.
Secondly, we analyze the eﬀect of herding and contrarian behavior on
market informational eﬃciency. We demonstrate that when traders are risk
averse and market makers are risk neutral, the informative content of trades
vanishes as agents become more con￿dent about the value of the security.
This happens because a risk averse informed trader exchanges the asset on
the one hand, to pro￿t from his private information, and on the other hand, to
reduce the risk of his portfolio. If the past trades induce strong beliefs about
the value of the asset, then an additional private signal will slightly aﬀect a
trader￿s belief. Consequently, his action will mainly re￿ect the risk-sharing
motivation without providing any additional information on the value of the
asset. Thus, in general the long run information content of trades is smaller
with respect to a situation where all agents are risk neutral.
We show that depending on the distribution of traders￿ portfolio compo-
sition, this phenomenon can generate informational cascade and cause long
run mispricing in the sense that agents never learn the true value of the asset
and that in the long run, prices are bounded away from fundamentals.7 For
5This point is also emphasized by HautiŁre (2001) who extends the AZ￿s model to
investigate the impact of short sales constraint on herd behavior.
6An investor engages in contrarian behavior when he takes an action he would not have
taken had he not known that other investors have taken the opposite action.
7This results seems to hold even when risk averse market makers face risk neutral
5example, when risk averse agents formed their portfolio in previous trading
rounds and the size of trade per round is an integer multiple of a minimum
size, then an informational cascade will eventually occur. This result is in
contrast to the ￿ndings of AZ and of the classical microstructure theory
where repeated interaction always leads to informational eﬃciency.
A similar ineﬃciency result is obtained by Lee (1998) by introducing
transaction cost in a sequential trade model. He shows that information
aggregation failure is due to the existence of transaction costs which may
prevent traders from revealing their private information. In our model infor-
mational ineﬃciency is obtained in absence of transaction cost.8
Thirdly, we show how a market designer could improve long term infor-
mational eﬃciency by changing some parameters of the trading mechanism.
Namely, an appropriate choice of the allowed size of trade could restore long
term eﬃciency. We explicitly give the expression for this choice as a function
of the distribution of risky asset among risk averse agents.
Finally, we will discuss the properties of quotes and bid ask spread when
there is an informational cascade. The evolution of quotes in presence of
an informational cascade depends on market makers￿ degree of risk aversion.
Speci￿cally, if market makers are risk neutral and an informational cascade
occurs, then spread is zero, and public information, as well as prices, are
constant. If market makers are risk averse, spread remains positive and quotes
move even in the presence of informational cascade.
In section 2 the notations, the assumptions and the basic structure of
the model are presented. In section 3 we provide the formal de￿nitions
of herd behavior, contrarian behavior, informational cascade and long run
informational eﬃciency. In section 4 we present a simple speci￿cation of
the model that shows that when market makers and traders attach diﬀerent
valuation to the asset, herd and contrarian behavior as well as informational
cascade occur. Section 5 introduces risk averse investors in the model and
studies the equilibrium of the economy where risk averse traders face risk
neutral market makers. Section 6 discusses some extension of the model and
namely the case of risk neutral traders versus risk averse market makers.
Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs.
traders.
8In Lee￿s model traders can trade the asset several times. The complexity following
from this assumption requires the speci￿cation of traders utility function to solve the
problem.
62T h e m o d e l
We consider a sequential trade model similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985):
a risky asset is exchanged for money among market makers and traders.
We denote with v = V + ε the liquidation value of the asset, where ε is
symmetrically distributed with mean 0,9 and V is equal to V with probability
π0 and to V < V with probability 1 − π0.T h e r a n d o m v a r i a b l e s V and ε
are independently distributed.
Trading mechanism. Trading occurs sequentially and each time interval
is long enough to accommodate at most one trade. At the beginning of each
trading period, market makers simultaneously set their bid and ask quotes.
Then, traders are randomly selected. At any given period t, the selected
trader can buy or sell a ￿xed quantity q of the asset, at the most attractive
ask (At)o rb i dp r i c e( Bt) respectively.10 Traders leave the market after they
have had the opportunity to trade.
Traders. We denote by UT(v,x,m) the utility function for a given trader
where x and m are respectively the amount of risky asset and money in his
portfolio. We will refer to x as the inventory of the trader. For simplicity,
we assume that all traders have the same utility function but they can diﬀer
for the compositions of their portfolios that are assumed to be independently
and identically distributed. Speci￿cally, considering a set Σ ⊂ R2,w ed e n o t e
F(Σ) = Pr((x,m) ∈ Σ), i.e. the probability that in a generic period t,t h e
portfolio composition of a trader is in Σ.
Each trader receives a private signal s ∈ {l,h}. Signals are i.i.d. across
traders and independent from ε and from the compositions of agents￿ port-
folios. We assume Pr(s =l|V = V )=P r ( s =h|V =V )=p ∈ (1/2,1).S i g n a l
l is more likely when V = V and it can be interpreted as a ￿Bearish￿ signal.
Similarly, s = h can be interpreted as a ￿Bullish￿ signal. In other words,
E[v|s = l] <E [v] <E [v|s = h]. 11
Market makers. We denote by UM(v,x,m) a market maker￿s utility func-
tion when x and m are respectively the amount of risky asset and money in
his portfolio. Market makers know the ex-ante distribution of v and s but,
9In other words, Pr(ε <x )=P r ( −ε <x )
10The hypothesis of a ￿xed quantity of trade will be relaxed in section 5.1.
11The results of the paper do not rely on symmetric binary signals that are assumed for
the tractability of the model.
7unlike traders, they do not receive any private signals on the realization of
V.
Public belief. We denote Ht the history of trades up to time t − 1.A l l
t h ea g e n t so b s e r v eHt but they do not know the identity of past traders.




the public belief at time t. For any given
trader￿s action A ∈ {buy,sell,no trade}, the dynamics of the public belief
evolves according to the Bayes￿ rule: πt+1 =P r
£
V =V |Ht,A
⁄ def = Π(πt,A).





6= πt.W ed e n o t ev(πt)=E[v|Ht]=E[V|Ht] the expecta-
tion of v when the public belief is πt.F i n a l l y ,w e s a y t h a t Ht is a positive
history (resp. negative history)i fπt >π 0 (resp. πt <π 0).
Private belief. An informed traders re￿nes public information with that





, s ∈ {h,l},
an informed traders￿ belief at time t.W et h e nd e n o t evs(πt)=v(πs
t).
Note that private signals provide information on the realization of V
but not on the realization of ε. For this reason the learning process in the
economy only regards V, whereas the presence of ε guarantees that the
uncertainty on v remains even when the realization of V is known. The
presence of ε is crucial for the existence of herding when market makers and
traders diﬀer in risk aversion.
3T h e d e ￿nitions of herding informational cas-
cade and eﬃciency
We adopt exactly the same de￿nition of herding, contrarian behavior and
informational cascade as in Avery and Zemsky (1998). Herding occurs when
a trader imitates others, whereas a trader engages in contrarian behavior
when he behaves in the opposite way with respect to others.
A trader with private signal s engages in buy (sell) herding behavior if:
(i) initially he strictly prefers not to buy the asset (resp. not to sell); (ii)
after observing a positive history of trades Ht ,i . e .πt >π 0 (resp. negative
history, i.e. πt <π 0), he strictly prefers to buy (resp. sell).
A trader engages in buy (sell) contrarian behavior if: (i) initially he
strictly prefers not to buy (resp. not to sell); (ii) after observing a nega-
8tive (resp. positive) history of trades Ht, he strictly prefers to buy (resp.
sell).
In other words, a trader engages in buy (resp. sell) herding or contrarian
behavior when two conditions are met: ￿rst, if initially he has the option
to trade, then he strictly prefers not to buy (resp. sell); second, if after
observing an history of trade, he has the option to trade, then he strictly
prefers to buy (resp. sell). If the history he has observed is positive, we
say that he engages in buy herding (resp. sell contrarian behavior), whereas
if the history is negative, he engages in buy contrarian behavior (resp. sell
herding).
Following AZ, we distinguish between herding or contrarian behavior and
informational cascade.
An informational cascade occurs when the actions of all informed traders
are independent from their private information.
Note that at time t, an informational cascade occurs, if and only if
πt+1 = πt. Indeed, as the trade in time t is not aﬀected by the trader￿s
private information, it will provide no new information on the realization of
V, so that public beliefs will be unchanged. Note that herding, or contrarian,
behavior and informational cascade are a relate but a distinct phenomena.
For example, when all the traders engage in buy herding, then an informa-
tional cascade occurs. However, it is possible to observe an informational
c a s c a d ee v e nw h e nd i ﬀerent traders choose diﬀerent actions provided that
their choice is not aﬀected by the signal received.
The occurrence of an informational cascade is related to the informational
eﬃciency properties of the market. Indeed, if an informational cascade oc-
curs, the learning process stops and prices cannot incorporate agents infor-
mations. More precisely, prices are strong-form eﬃcient if they re￿ect all
private information available in the economy:
The market is said to be strong-form eﬃcient in the long run,i fp r i c e s







9It is worth stressing that in the ￿nancial microstructure literature it is
generally accepted that market is strong form eﬃcient in the long run12.I n
the following sections we will show that even when prices are endogenous,
herd, contrarian behavior, and informational cascades can occur and that
market is not eﬃcient in the long run.
4A b a s i c m o d e l
For expositional clarity we begin with a simple example that illustrates the
occurrence of history dependent behavior.
We assume that UT(v,x,m)=vx + m whereas UM(v,x,m)=( θv +
C)x + m ,w i t hθ ≥ 0. An interesting aspect of this simple set up is that it
includes as a particular case the simplest version of herding models, where
price is exogenously ￿xed. Moreover, it also includes as particular case the
simplest version of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) where price is endogenous
and herding as well as informational cascade are impossible.
Competition among equally uninformed market makers leads to bid and
ask price such that the expected pro￿t from trading q risky asset is zero.
This expectation is computed taking into account the informational content
of the trade. Namely, at any time t bid and ask prices solve
E[(θv + C)(x + q)+m − qBt|sell order] − E[(θv + C)x + m|sell order]=0
E[(θv + C)(x − q)+m + qAt|buy order] − E[(θv + C)x + m|buy order]=0
Therefore, market markers￿ quotes in period t are At = θv(Π(πt,buy)) + C
and Bt = θv(Π(πt,sell)) + C.
In this example, agents￿ valuation for the asset can be decomposed into a
common value component, v(πt), and a private value distortion: θ 6=1and
C 6=0 .T h ed i ﬀerence between market makers quotes and traders valuations
is responsible for trades. On one hand it depends on the diﬀerence in the
common value component due to the asymmetry of information (i.e. v(πt)−
vs(πt)), and on the other hand on the private value distortion. At time t,a
trader who received a signal s will buy the asset only if vs(πt) ≥ At and he
will sell only if vs(πt) ≤ Bt.
When θ =0and C ∈ (V ,V ), the model corresponds to the simplest
version of the herding model in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Whelch (1992)
12See O￿Hara (1995).
10(BHW henceforth). In this case they show that herding can occur. This is
illustrated in Figure 1 that plots the market makers quotes and traders￿
valuations, vs(π), as functions of the public belief π. No matter the public
belief π, bid and ask prices are equal to C . Suppose that the initial prior
π0 ∈ (π∗,π∗∗),w eh a v evl(π0) <B 0 = C = A0 <v h(π0). Thus, initially, an
informed trader will sell the asset only if he has a Bearish signal, whereas he
will buy the asset only if he has a Bullish signal. Consequently, traders orders
are informative as long as πt ∈ (π∗,π ∗∗). However, an history of trade that
is suﬃciently unbalanced in one direction (buy or sell) will lead the public
belief πt to be larger than π∗∗ or smaller than π∗. At this point buy or sell
herding behavior will start respectively.
The parameters values θ =1and C =0 ,l e a dt ot h eG l o s t e na n dM i l g r o m
model. AZ have shown that in such a framework, herding is impossible since
for any level of the public belief πt,o n eg e t svl(πt)=Bt <A t = vh(πt).13
Figure 2 illustrates this case. The bid and ask prices are equal to vl(πt) and
vh(πt) respectively so that informed traders with the Bullish signal (resp.
Bearish signal) always buy (resp. sell) the risky asset no matter what is
the evolution of the public beliefs πt.I nt h i sc a s ei n f o r m e dt r a d e r s ￿a c t i o n s
always re￿ect the sign of their signal.
The following proposition shows that as soon as θ 6=1or C 6=0 ,h e r d i n g
or contrarian behavior can occur even in this basic one dimensional private
signal setting.
Proposition 1 There exist Ch, Ch, Cc, Cc such that:
i) If C ∈ (Ch,Ch) and θ ∈ (0,1), then there exists a level π0 of initial belief
such that buy herding as well as sell herding occur with positive probability.
ii) If C ∈ (Cc,Cc) and θ>1, then there exists a level π0 of initial belief
such that buy contrarian behavior as well as sell contrarian behavior occur
with positive probability.
The main message of Proposition 1 is that even if uncertainty has one
dimension, when market makers and traders attach even slightly diﬀerent
value to the traded asset, herd and contrarian behaviors can occur. Moreover,
when herding or contrarian behavior start, the quotes do not change anymore
and the ￿ow of trade does not provide information on V. Thus, in this simple
setting, there is no diﬀerence between herding and informational cascade and
13In standard microstructure models the presence of liquidity traders implies vl(πt) <
Bt <A t <v h(πt) that does not change the result in term of impossibility of herding.
11whenever θ 6=1or C 6=0 , agents￿ beliefs cannot converge to the truth (market
is not strong- form informational eﬃcient even in the long run).
As a general rule, the occurrence of herd or contrarian behavior in stock
markets relies on the fact that market makers and traders can react diﬀerently
to an history of trade. Namely, herding behavior is likely to occur when a
trading history has unimportant eﬀects on market makers￿ quotes, when
compared to its eﬀect on traders￿ valuation for the asset. Take for example,
a sequence of buy orders that increases the public belief πt.S u p p o s e t h a t
this increases market makers quotes slightly in comparison to the increase
in the traders￿ valuation. Eventually, traders￿s valuation for the asset will
be so high that it becomes pro￿table to buy the asset even for those traders
who received a Bearish signal, and would have initially sold it. Conversely,
contrarian behavior occurs when market makers quotes over-react to the ￿ow
of trade. For example, a sequence of buy orders can increase market makers￿
quotes so dramatically, that it becomes pro￿table to sell the asset even for
those traders that would have initially bought it. 14
Proposition 1 illustrate exactly this phenomenon: the parameter θ rep-
resents the sensitivity of market makers￿ quotes to a change in public belief.
When θ<1, this sensitivity is low and the information provided by the ￿ow
of trades will aﬀect more the informed traders￿s valuations rather than mar-
ket makers￿ quotes. Thus, herding behavior is likely to occur. When θ>1
prices over-react to the arrival of information leading to contrarian behavior.
Figure 3 illustrates case i) in Proposition 1.
Parameter C introduces a bias in market makers￿ valuation that is in-
dependent on information. When C is negative (resp. positive), market
makers quotes will be on average lower (resp. higher) than traders￿ valu-
ation. Therefore traders will be prone to buy (resp. sell) no matter their
information. Thus, a negative C is responsible for the existence of buy herd-
ing and buy contrarian behavior. This is illustrated by Figure 4. Similarly,
a positive C will be responsible for sell herding or contrarian behavior.
14For example, in AZ multidimensional uncertainty induces market makers and traders
to interpret diﬀerently the same trading history so that price sensitivity to information
diﬀers from that of informed traders￿ valuation.
125 Risk aversion and herding
Now, we study how diﬀerences in the level of risk aversion of informed traders
and market makers can lead to history dependent behaviors and informa-
tional cascade. Firstly, we prove that, when market makers and traders have
diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion, their monetary valuations for the risky as-
set diﬀer. Secondly, we show that this diversity can reduce market eﬃciency,
and generate history dependent behaviors as well as informational cascade.
To this purpose, we extend the method that was illustrated in the previous
section to study the case of heterogenous traders.
We work thereafter under the assumption that market makers are risk
neutral whereas informed traders are risk averse:15
Assumption 1: UM (v,x,m)=vx + m and UT (v,x,m)=u(vx + m)
with u : I R → I R,d i ﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
We start with the analysis of agent￿s behavior.
5.1 Agents￿ behavior
Risk averse traders￿ behavior. Consider a trader whose utility function u
satis￿es Assumption 1. We denote with β and α the trader￿s buy and sell
reservation prices that are implicitly de￿ned by equations (1) and (2) respec-
tively.
E [u(vx + m) − u(v(x + q)+m − qβ)] = 0 (1)
E [u(vx + m) − u(v(x − q)+m + qα)] = 0 (2)
Consider a trader whose portfolio is (x,m) and let π be his belief that
V = V . The buy reservation price β(π,x,m) represents the maximum asset￿s
price that this trader is willing to pay for q additional assets. Similarly, the
sell reservation price α(π,x,m) is the minimum asset￿s price at which he
accepts to sell q assets.
If at time t market makers￿ ask and bid quotes are (At,B t) and a trader
with signal s and portfolio (x,m) is allowed to trade, then he will buy if
β(πs
t,x,m) ≥ At , he will sell if α(πs
t,x,m) ≤ Bt a n dh ew i l ln o tt r a d e
elsewhere.
15In section 6 we brie￿y discuss the case of risk averse market makers versus risk neutral
traders.
13Thus, a trader￿s behavior is determined by the composition of his portfolio
(x,m) on one hand, and by his belief π on the other hand. That is to
say, a trader buys q risky assets at price A if his portfolio￿s composition is
(x,m) ∈ Φ(π,A),w h e r e
Φ(π,A)={(x,m)|β(π,x,m) ≥ A}.
The set Φ(π,A) represents all portfolios compositions (x,m) such that a risk
averse trader with belief π is willing to buy at least q assets at price B.
Similarly, an agent with belief π will sell at price B,i fh i sp o r t f o l i oc o m -
position (x,m) ∈ Ψ(π,B),w h e r e
Ψ(π,B)={(x,m)|α(π,x,m) ≤ B}.
Here, Ψ(π,B) is the set of portfolios compositions such that a risk averse
agent with belief π is willing to sell at least q risky assets at price A.
The following lemma describes some relevant properties of reservation
prices.
Lemma 1 The mappings (π,x,m) −→ β(π,x,m) and (π,x,m) −→
α(π,x,m) are continuous on [0,1] ￿ I R ￿ I R.M o r e o v e r ,
1) For any m,i tr e s u l t s
if x<−
q
2 then, β(0,x,m) >V, β(1,x,m) > V,
if x = −
q
2 then, β(0,x,m)=V , β(1,x,m)=V,
if x>−
q
2 then, β(0,x,m) <V, β(1,x,m) < V.
2) For any m,i tr e s u l t s
if x<
q
2 then, α(0,x,m) >V, α(1,x,m) > V,
if x =
q
2 then, α(0,x,m)=V , α(1,x,m)=V,
if x>
q
2 then, α(0,x,m) <V, α(1,x,m) < V.
Lemma 1 states that a risk averse investor￿s reservation prices for a risky
asset will in general be diﬀerent from the expected value of the asset given
the investor￿s information. In particular, when there is no uncertainty on
V, but it remains the uncertainty on ε, the bid reservation price is equal to





2) units of the risky asset, because of risk aversion, he is
reluctant to increase his position (resp. inclined to increase his position) and
the maximum asset￿s price that this investor is willing to pay is lower (resp.
14larger) than the expected value of the asset. Result 2 of the lemma develops
the same idea for the ask price and symmetric interpretations hold.
It is worth stressing here the role that the component ε in the value of
the asset has in Lemma 1. Recall that the liquidation value of the risky asset
is v = V + ε. As traders receive signals that only depend on the realization
of V, they can only learn about V. Therefore, even for an agent who knows
exactly the realization of V (i.e. π =0or π =1 ), the uncertainty about v
is unresolved because of the presence of the random component ε.L e m m a
1 states that if this agent is risk averse then in general his reservation prices
will be diﬀerent from V.
Risk neutral market makers￿ behavior. Bertrand competition among equally
uninformed risk neutral market makers leads to bid and ask quotes that
are equal to the expected value of the asset given the available information.
Namely, time t bid quote, Bt, is equal to the maximum 16 of the solutions of
the following equation
Bt = E[v|Ht, trader sells at Bt]. (3)
The ask quote At is equal to the minimum 17 of the solutions of the equation
At = E[v|Ht, trader buys at At]. (4)
Lemma 2: S o l u t i o n so fe q u a t i o n s( 3 )a n d( 4 )a l w a y se x i s t . M o r e o v e r ,
At ∈ [vl(πt),v h(πt)] and Bt ∈ [vl(πt),v h(πt)].
Lemma 2 states that bid and ask quotes have an upper and a lower bounds
that correspond to the expected value of the asset given the past history and a
Bullish or a Bearish signal respectively. In other words, the information that
market makers extract from a given trading history cannot be more precise
than the one privately informed traders extract from the same history.
We conclude this section observing that from Lemma 2, when πt ap-
proaches 1 (resp. 0) the bid and ask price tend to V (resp. V ). However,
from Lemma 1 it follows that traders￿ reservation price are in general diﬀer-
ent from V (resp. V )e v e nw h e nπt approaches 1 (resp. 0). Similarly to what
16Any other solution of (3) would not be an equilibrium as there would exist a larger
bid that would provides positive pro￿t to the market makers.
17Any other solution of (4) would not be an equilibrium as there would exist a lower
ask that would provides positive pro￿t to the market makers.
15h a p p e n sf o rt h es i m p l em o d e li nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,t h i sd i ﬀerence between
market makers and traders￿s valuations for the asset is the cause of herding,
contrarian behavior and market informational ineﬃciency.
5.2 Individual herding
In order to understand the role of risk aversion in the occurrence of herding
and contrarian behavior, it is useful to distinguish two components in the
trading motivations of a risk averse investor: the information component and
the inventory component. The information component re￿ects the changes
in an investor￿s reservation prices that follow a good or bad news regarding
V. If the news about the realization of V is not perfectly informative, then,
ceteris paribus,i t se ﬀect on trading motivation will decrease when the prior
belief π approaches 0 or 1. For example, the impact of a Bullish signal on an
trader￿s belief, and thus on his reservation price, is negligible when his prior
belief π is close to 0 or to 1.T h a ti st os a y ,limπ→0(vh(π) − vl(π)) = 0 and
limπ→1(vh(π) − vl(π)) = 0.18
The inventory component re￿ects the agent￿s preference for low-risk-
portfolio. For a given level of π a n dag i v e nt r a d i n gp r i c e ,ar i s ka v e r s e
investor is prone to sell risky assets if his inventory is suﬃciently large, and
prone to buy if his inventory is suﬃciently small. The inventory component
increases with the investor￿s degree of risk aversion, the portfolio￿s exposure
to risk |x|, and the unresolved uncertainty about the asset fundamentals.
In the following proposition we show that when the public belief is suﬃ-
ciently close to 0 or to 1, an informed trader￿s signal aﬀects his action only
if his inventory x is suﬃciently close to q/2 or −q/2. Therefore, all informed
traders whose inventory x is not equal to q/2,o rt o−q/2, will eventually
ignore the information provided by their private signals.
Denote with Θs
buy the set {(x,m)|x<−q/2} ∩ (Φ(πs
0,A 0))c. Similarly,
denote Θs
sell the set {(x,m)|x>q / 2} ∩ (Ψ(πs
0,B 0))c. The set Θs
buy (resp.
Θs
sell) represents the portfolio compositions of those traders with signal s
that at time 0 prefer not to buy (resp. sell) the asset, despite at time 0 they
have the option to trade and their inventory x is smaller than −q/2 (resp.
greater than q/2).
18This property is usual in models with a binary not perfectly informative signals: strong
prior overwhelm a bounded private signal. (See Chamley 2001)
16Proposition 2: Under assumption 1, a trader who receives a signal s
and whose portfolio (x,m) ∈ Θs
buy (resp. (x,m) ∈ Θs
sell) engages in buy (resp.
sell) herding or contrarian behavior with positive probability.
A trader engages in herding or contrarian behavior when two require-
ments are met: (i) initially he strictly prefers not to buy (or to sell); (ii) after
observing an history of trade he strictly prefers to buy (resp. sell). Con-
dition (x,m) ∈ Θs
buy obviously guarantees requirement (i). To understand
why when x<−q/2, he will eventually decide to buy, take for example the
case where the public belief πt converges to 1. Then, the bid and ask quotes
will converge to V from Lemma 2, whereas β(πs
t,x,m) > V from Lemma
1. When πt is suﬃciently close to 1 we have β(πs
t,x,m) > V ’ At,a n di f
the trader has the option to trade, he will buy the asset. In other words, in
the long run the information component of a traders￿ action vanishes and his
trade only re￿ects the inventory component. Consequently, traders whose
portfolio (x,m) ∈ Θs
buy, may engage in buy herding or buy contrarian behav-
ior depending on the realization of a positive or negative history respectively.
Similarly, if a trader￿s portfolio composition belongs to Θs
sell,ap o s i t i v eo r
negative history may induce him to engage in sell contrarian behavior or sell
herding respectively.
5.3 Informational cascade and eﬃciency
What are the consequences of agents herding or contrarian behavior on mar-
ket informational eﬃciency?
In this section, we study under which conditions a suﬃciently long his-
tory of trade guarantees that agents ultimately learn the true value of the
asset. Moreover, we analyze the eﬃciency properties of the economy as it is
measured by the speed of convergence of prices (and beliefs) to the true value
of the asset. Following Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), this speed of conver-
g e n c ec a nb em e a s u r e db yt h er a t ea tw h i c ht h el i k e l i h o o dr a t i oLt = πt
1−πt
tends to in￿nity, when V = V , or to zero when V = V .
Proposition 3 states that the long term informational eﬃciency of the
market, as well as the speed of convergence of beliefs to the truth, depends
on the distribution of traders￿ portfolio composition F(.).
Proposition 3: Under assumption 1, the following holds.
171) The presence of risk averse traders reduces the informational eﬃciency
of the market when compared to a situation where agents are risk neutral.
2) If F is such that there is a zero probability that a trader￿s inventory is
close to either q/2 or −q/2 , then long run informational ineﬃciency occurs
almost surely.
3) If the distribution F is a continuous distribution function, then the
rate of convergence of the asset price to its fundamental value tends to zero.
Result 1 in Proposition 3 establishes that, in an economy with risk averse
traders, trading prices converge to market fundamental at a lower rate 19
with respect to an economy where market makers and traders are risk neu-
t r a l .T h i si sn o ts u r p r i s i n ga s ,i np r e s e n c eo fr i s ka v e r s i o nt h e r em i g h tb ea
proportion of informed traders whose inventory is so unbalanced that their
trade is actually not informative. This result is in tune with the standard
rational expectations equilibrium models. Indeed, the presence of an inven-
tory component in informed traders￿ motivation can be reinterpreted as the
existence of an additional noise (for example coming from liquidity traders)
that reduces market informational eﬃciency.
Result 2 is more striking as it contradicts the common wisdom that re-
peated interaction in ￿nancial market always leads to informational eﬃciency
and that in the long run prices always converge to fundamentals. Result 2
is also somewhat in contrast with AZ that prove that multidimensional un-
certainty is not suﬃcient to produce long run mispricing. To understand
Result 2, note that, for Proposition 2, when the public belief πt is suﬃciently
close to 1 or to 0 a trader￿s order will only re￿ect his inventory unbalance
unless his inventory x is suﬃciently close to q/2 or to −q/2. However, if the
inventory of all traders is bounded away from q/2 and from −q/2,w h e nπt
is suﬃciently close either to 0 or 1, trades stop providing information on V
and an informational cascade starts. It is worth stressing that, as any ￿nite
history of trade is in general compatible with any realization of V,t h e r ei s
a positive probability that the public belief will be entrapped around 0 (or
around 1)e v e ni fV = V (resp. V = V ). In other words, not only the public
belief does not converge to the truth, but agents￿ beliefs can be completely
19For example a sequence of buy orders (resp. sell orders) changes the likelihood ratio
Lt at a lower rate.
18incorrect even in the long run. Thus, an informational cascade in the wrong
direction can occur with positive probability.
Note that when an informational cascade starts, the bid-ask spread is zero
and quotes stop moving because orders stop providing information. Thus,
history dependent behavior can cause long run mispricing. Note also that
whenever traders formed their portfolio with previous transactions in the
same market, then the condition on F required for Result 2 is met. Indeed,
considering that the size of each trade is q, if a trader bought his portfolio
in previous trading rounds, then his inventory x will be an integer multiple
of –q and the hypothesis of Result 2 will be satis￿ed.
Result 3 extends result 2 emphasizing that, even when F is continuous,
a n di nt h el o n gr u nt h em a r k e ti se ﬃcient, the process of convergence of the
public belief to the truth is so slow that it might be indistinguishable from an
informational cascade. By contrast, if traders and market makers were risk
neutral, the ratio at which πt converges to the truth would be strictly positive
and independent from πt. This is for example what happens in Diamond and
Verrecchia (1987).
5.4 Market mechanism and informational eﬃciency
In this section we study how the market designer should choose the parame-
ters of the trading mechanism in order to improve the long term informational
eﬃciency of the market. To begin with, we assume that the market regulator
can choose the amount of risky assets q t h a tc a nb et r a d e da te a c hp e r i o d .
We denote with qs and qb t h ea m o u n to fa s s e tt h a tc a nb es o l do rb o u g h tr e -
spectively. We show how the choice of appropriate qs and qb can prevent the
occurrence of informational cascade. From the previous discussion we know
that for a given allowed size of trade q, in the long run the only informative
buy orders (sell orders) come from investors whose inventory is suﬃciently
close to −q/2 (resp. q/2) and that informational cascade arises when there
is no such investor in the economy (see result 2 in Proposition 3). Therefore,
for a given distribution of traders￿ portfolio composition, F, conditions that

























19Indeed by choosing qs and qb such that these two conditions are satis￿ed,
the market designer ensures that there is a positive probability of observing






When trader￿s inventories are discretely distributed, long run eﬃciency
can be improved by choosing trading sizes for the buy and sell orders which
maximize the speed of convergence of beliefs to the truth. We have the
following result.
Lemma 3: When trader￿s inventories are discretely distributed, long run
informational eﬃc i e n c yc a nb ei m p r o v e db yc h o o s i n gt h et r a d i n gs i z e sf o rt h e
buy and sell orders, qb and qs,s u c ht h a t
qs =m a x
q Pr(x = q/2), (5)
qb =m a x
q Pr(x = −q/2). (6)
Now, we prove that the ineﬃciency results of the previous section do not
rely on the fact that the size of trade per period is ￿xed. We show that
ineﬃciency follows from the fact that the space of traders￿ action is discrete.
This is in tune with the ￿ndings of the literature on herding (See Chamley
2001).
Consider a ￿nancial market whose trading mechanism diﬀers from the
one described in section 2 only for the fact that traders can decide to buy
(sell), at the ask price (resp. bid price ), any quantity Q ∈ nq,w i t hn ∈ N,
with n<N ,w h e r eN is a natural number. In other words, in every period
each market maker quotes one bid and one ask price at which he is willing to
sell or buy respectively any quantity Q of the risky asset up to a maximum
quantity of Nq. This is what happens for example in Nasdaq SOES market.
Traders can buy or sell round lots of the risky asset, the size of the lot is q and
no more than N l o t sc a nb et r a d e da te a c hr o u n d .T h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n
shows that the result of Proposition 3 can be extended to the case of round
lots trading.
Proposition 4: Under assumption 1, if at each stage traders can trade
round lots up to a maximum of N lots, and if each market makers can quote
only one ask and one bid at which he satis￿es any buy or sell order respectively
up to N lots , then the following holds.
201) The presence of risk averse traders reduces the informational eﬃciency
of the market when compared to a situation where agents are risk neutral.
2) If for any n ∈ {−N,−N +1 ,...,N} the probability that a trader in-
ventory is arbitrarily close to q(n + 1
2) is zero, then long run informational
ineﬃciency occurs.
3) If the distribution F is a continuous distribution function, then the
rate of convergence of the asset price to its fundamental value tends to zero.
Proposition 4 suggests that with round-lots trading mechanisms infor-
mational cascade and long run mispricing are possible. For example, this is
particularly true when traders bought their portfolio using the same trading
m e c h a n i s m . I n d e e d ,i fa g e n t st r a d e dd i s c r e t eq u a n t i t yt h e yw i l lh a v ed i s -
crete portfolios compositions and the hypothesis for result 2 in proposition
4 will be satis￿ed. Notice that, passing from a round lots mechanism to an
odd lots20 mechanism could improve market eﬃciency. However, strong-form
informational eﬃciency cannot be completely reached as an odd lots mecha-
nism can be seen as a round lots mechanism where q i so n es h a r eo ft h er i s k y
asset.
6 Extension
In this section, we brie￿y discuss the occurrence of herding and informational
cascade when risk neutral traders face risk averse market makers. The study
of the multi-period price competition among risk averse market maker is
more involved than in the risk neutral case. We believe that a complete
study of the risk averse market maker case would over complicate the analy-
sis without aﬀecting the main implications on the existence of herding and
informational cascade. To be thorough, we discuss how the results of the
previous sections would change with risk averse market makers versus risk
neutral informed trader. Following Ho and Stoll (1983) and Biais (1993) one
could say that at some time t the market ask (bid) price is equal (or close)
to the second lowest (resp. highest) sell (resp. buy) reservation price among
20i.e. a situation where in each trading round, it is possible to exchange any amount of
the risky asset up to a maximum amount.
21market makers.21 Still, as in our set up traders are privately informed, market
makers take into account the informational content of a trade when choosing
their quotes. Therefore, traders￿ orders act on market makers￿ quotes in two
w a y s :o nt h eo n eh a n da no r d e rc a np r o v i d es o m ei n f o r m a t i o no nt h ev a l u eo f
the asset and change the public belief. We call this eﬀect the information ef-
fect22. On the other hand, traders￿ orders change the composition of market
makers￿ portfolio, and consequently aﬀect their reservation prices and quotes
even when they do not change the public belief. We denote this phenomenon
the inventory eﬀect. Note that if a market maker￿s reservation prices are de-
creasing functions of his inventory23, then the information and the inventory
eﬀects move quotes in the same direction magnifying the sensitivity of prices
to the history of trade.
There are two relevant diﬀerences between the case discussed here and
the one studied in section 5.1. The ￿rst diﬀerence is that with risk averse
traders, prices become gradually less informative as the fraction of traders
whose trade is not informative increases. By contrast, when traders are risk
neutral, herding (or contrarian) behavior starts simultaneously for all traders.
Indeed, when traders are riskn e u t r a l ,t h e ya c t u a l l yd i ﬀer only for the sign
of their information. Thus, when their actions do not re￿ect their private
signal, they all behave exactly in the same way. For this reason, with risk
neutral traders, history dependent behavior always implies an informational
cascade.
The second diﬀerence is that an informational cascade never ends when
market makers are risk neutral, whereas it might end if market makers are
risk averse. In particular the bid-ask spread is equal to zero in presence of
informational cascades when trader are risk averse whereas spread continues
to evolve in presence of informational cascade when market maker are risk
averse. Indeed, when market makers are risk averse, quotes move because of
the inventory eﬀect even when orders do not conceal any new information.
This can end an informational cascade. For example, consider a situation
where market makers￿ inventories are so low, that quotes will be suﬃciently
high to induce informed traders to sell the asset no matter their signal. In this
21Where, a market maker￿ buy and sell reservation prices could be de￿ned in the same
whay traders reservation prices are de￿ned in the previous section.
22This is the only force that moves quotes in the risk neutral market makers case (in-
cluding AZ model).
23For example this is the case when market makers have a CARA utility functions.
22situation, sell herding behavior occurs, an informational cascade starts and
the public belief is steady. As on average, there will be more sell orders than
buy orders, market makers￿ inventory will gradually increase and this might
decrease the bid and ask quotes until the point that only informed traders
that received a ￿Bearish￿ signal still want to sell. This would temporarily
end the informational cascade. This example also illustrates that market
makers risk aversion can easily produce contrarian behavior because when
the information and the inventory eﬀects act in the same direction, prices
over react to the trading history.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We studied how the diﬀerence in risk aversion between traders and mar-
ket makers can originate herd and contrarian behavior in a sequential trade
framework. Furthermore, we examined how these phenomena aﬀect the mar-
ket long run informational eﬃciency. In general, herd and contrarian behav-
ior may occur when trading histories aﬀect diﬀerently market makers￿ and
traders￿ reservation prices. Herd behavior may arise when quotes sensitivity
to the ￿ow of trade is lower than traders￿ valuation sensitivity, whereas con-
trarian behavior follows from over-reaction of quotes to the ￿ow of trade. We
proved that both these phenomena are compatible with a situation where (i)
market participants diﬀer in their degrees of risk aversion (ii) the minimum
and the maximum size of trade per period are ￿xed. This suggests that herd
and contrarian behavior in stock market should be seen as the norm rather
than the exception.
The diﬀerence between market makers and traders risk aversion can also
generate informational cascade and thus, long run mispricing and market
informational ineﬃciency.
If traders are risk averse and market makers are risk neutral, when an
informational cascade starts, the information ￿ow stops, prices are constant,
spread is zero. The probability of observing an informational cascade depends
on the distribution of the risky asset across informed traders and it is one
whenever traders built their portfolio in previous trading stages. Still, a
market designer can improve market informational eﬃciency by appropriately
choosing the allowed size of trade per period.
If risk averse market makers face risk neutral traders, when informational
cascade starts, the spread shrinks but remains positive. Moreover in pres-
23ence of informational cascade quotes move because market makers￿ portfolio
change. This can temporarily restore the informativeness of trades, but in
general it is not suﬃcient to guarantee long run strong form eﬃciency of the
market.
8 Appendix
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 :In order to simplify the notation we assume V =
V +1 .H e r e πt corresponds to Pr(V = V +1 |Ht).L e t Ch = V (1 − θ),
Ch =( V + 1)(1 − θ), Cc =( V + 1)(1 − θ), Cc = V (1 − θ).C o n s i d e r c a s e
(i): C ∈ (V (1 − θ),(V +1 ) ( 1− θ)) and θ ∈ (0,1). A direct application of
the intermediate value theorem shows there exists an interval I in (0,1)such
that:
∀π ∈ Iv
l(π) <θ (V + π)+C<v
h(π),
which induces that the informed traders with low signal will sell whereas the
informed traders with high signal will buy24.I no t h e rw o r d si n f o r m e da g e n t s
trading strategies change with their private signal. We now consider π0 in I.
Taking advantage of the relation vh(1) = vl(1) = V +1 <θ (V +1)+C,w e
apply again the intermediate value theorem and deduce there exist V,al e f t
neighborhood of 1 such that:
∀π ∈ V v
h(π) ≥ v
l(π) >θ (V + π)+C.
This implies that in such beliefs￿ region any informed agents buy no matter
his signal and ask (and bid) prices are equal to θ(V + π)+C.W e d e d u c e
that for a number of buy orders suﬃciently large the public belief πt lies in a
left neighborhood of 1. To conclude the proof, simply remark that as signals
are not perfectly correlat e dt ot h er e a l i z a t i o no fV,a￿nite history that
is suﬃciently unbalanced in one direction occurs with positive probability.
Hence assertion (i) for buy herding. Part (ii) is proved using analogous
arguments.¥
Proof of lemma 1:T h ec o n t i n u i t yo fα(.) and β(.) rely on the the diﬀer-
entiability and monotonicity of u. We prove result 1) for π =1 .T h ep r o o f
24Notice that the strict inequality vl(π) <v h(π) comes from the informativeness of the
private signal (that is p>1
2).
24for π =0and the proof of result 2) are symmetric. First, it follows from















(x + q)+m − qβ
¢⁄
=0 (7)









(x+q)+m−qV )) has the same probability distribution
than W0
0 = Vx+ m + ε|x| (resp. W0
1 = Vx+ m + ε|x + q|). Note that if
x = −q/2,t h e n|x| = |x + q|.T h u s , i f x = −
q
2, equality (7) is satis￿ed if
and only if β(1,
q
2,m)=V .N o t ea l s ot h a ti fx<−q/2,t h e n|x| > |x + q|.












1)] = E [u(W1)]. (8)
Finally, remarking the equality









we deduce from (7) and (8) that β(1,x,m) > V for x<
q
2. Similarly, if




P r o o fo fl e m m a2 :To prove the existence of the solution of equation (4),
notice ￿rst that
E[v|Ht,trader buys at At]=E[V + ε|Ht,trader buys at At]=
= E[V|Ht,trader buys at At]=
= V Pr(V =V |Ht,trader buys at At)+
+V (1 − Pr(V = V |Ht,trader buys at At)) ∈ [V ,V ],
Suppose that Pr(trader buys at At|Ht) > 0 for any At ∈ [V ,V ],i nt h i sc a s e
the probabilities in the previous expression are well de￿ned, and so we have









25Simply remark that as u0 is decreasing, for any real a and any positive real b,w eh a v e
cov(ε,u 0(a + bε)) = E[εu0(a + bε)] < 0, thus E[u(a + bε)] is decreasing in b.
25Now, according to (4), a market maker ask price is a ￿xed point of the
mapping g : ξ −→ E[v|Ht,t r a d e rb u y sa tξ] that satis￿es g(V ) ≥ V > 0
and g(V ) ≤ V . Assuming F(.) is continuous, the existence of a solution of
(4) comes from the mean value theorem. If traders￿ portfolios composition
are discretely distributed (i.e. F(.) is not continuous), then the existence
of the solution of (4) can be obtained by allowing traders to use any mixed
strategies when they are indiﬀerent between trading or not. In this case
E[v|Ht, trader buys at ξ] depends on the traders￿ mixed strategy, and so the
mapping g becomes a upper hemicontinous convex valued correspondence
that maps the set [V ,V ] in itself. Such correspondence has a ￿xed point
for the Kakutani￿s ￿xed point theorem. If Pr(trader buys at At|Ht)=0for
some At ∈ [V ,V ], then the probability (9) is not well de￿ned. In this case
it is possible to prove existence by completing the mapping g with an out-
of-equilibrium-path belief that satis￿es E[v|Ht,trader buys at At]=E[v|Ht]
when At is such that Pr(trader buys at At|Ht)=0 .T h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t t o
assume that in the economy there is a positive measure of liquidity traders
that buy at any price and whose action provides no information on V.
The relation vl(πt) ≤ At ≤ vh(πt) is equivalent to πl
t ≤ Pr(V = V |Ht,
trader buys at At) ≤ πh
t.I n o r d e r t o p r o v e At ≤ vh(πt), notice that (9) is
maximum when F(Φ(πl
t,A t)) = 0 and F(Φ(πh
t,A t)) = 1, and in this case
Pr(V = V |Ht,t r a d e rb u y sa tAt)=πh
t . Similarly, (9) is minimum when
F(Φ(πl
t,A t)) = 1 and F(Φ(πh
t,A t)) = 0, and in this case Pr(V = V |Ht,
trader buys at At)=πl
t ,t h a tp r o v e sAt ≥ vl(πt).T h e p r o o f f o r t h e b i d
quote can be obtained with a symmetric argument.¥
Proof of proposition 2: We provide the proof for buy herding and con-
trarian behaviors. A similar argument applies to sell herding and con-
trarian behaviors. Consider an informed trader who received signal s and
whose portfolio (x,m) ∈ Θs
buy. First, notice that as x/ ∈ Φ(πs
0,A 0),i n i -
tially the trader does not want to buy. Now, assume a positive history is
realized and no information cascade occurs; then public belief πt as well
as πs
t will be close to 1. Thanks to the presence of partially informative
signals, this happens with positive probability. Notice that V = v(1) =
β(1,−q/2,m) <β (1,x,m),w h e r et h es e c o n de q u a l i t ya n dt h el a s ti n e q u a l -
ity comes from result 1) in Lemma 1. Moreover, from Lemma 2 we know
that At ≤ v(πh
t). From the continuity of β(.) and v(.) with respect to
πt,w eh a v et h a tlimπt→1 v(πh
t) < limπt→1 β(πs
t,x,m) and therefore it re-
sults At ≤ v(πh
t) <β (πs
t,x,m) for πt suﬃciently close to 1. Thus, the
26trader eventually strictly prefers to buy and he engages in buy herd be-
havior. To prove that contrarian behavior occurs with positive probability,
assume that a negative history is realized and no information cascade oc-
curs. From lemma 1 we have V = v(0) = β(0,−q/2,m) <β (0,x,m).T h u s ,
limπt→0 v(πh
t) < limπt→0 β(πs
t,x,m), and therefore At ≤ v(πh
t) <β (πs
t,x,m)
for πt suﬃciently close to 1. Thus, the trader eventually strictly prefers to
buy and he engages in buy contrarian behavior. ¥
Proof of proposition 3: Before proceeding to the proof some method-
ological remarks have to be done. Our analysis is based on the approach
developed in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). Following these authors and
de￿ning the ratio Lt = πt
1−πt, the informational eﬃciency properties of the
market can be identi￿ed with the speed of convergence of Lt to in￿nity, if
V = V , and to zero if V = V .N o t i c e t h a t Lt = Πi=t
i=1r(Ai,π i) where
r(Ai,π i)=
Pr(Ai |V =V, H i)
Pr(Ai |V =V ,Hi).T h er a t i or(Ai,πi) is interpreted as the informa-
tive content of action Ai.I f r(Ai,πi) > 1,t h e na c t i o nAi is a good news
on the value of V; Ai is a bad news if r(Ai,π i) < 1, and it provides no
information if r(Ai,π i)=1 . In other words, the farther r(Ai,πi) from 1,
the larger the information content of Ai and so the larger the rate at which
Lt changes. In Diamond and Verrecchia, the ratio r(At,πt) does not depend
on the current public belief πt and the beliefs￿ speed of convergence to the
truth can be computed explicitly26. In our setting, because of risk aversion,
r(At,π t) does depend on πt and the study of information eﬃciency is more
involved.
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of the lemma:
Lemma 4: Let denote Ai ∈ {buy, sell, no trade} the action at date t = i
and consider the ratio r(Ai,π i)=
Pr(Ai |V =V, H i)
Pr(Ai |V =V ,Hi). Then, under assumption








2) If there exist w and w0 neighborhoods of q/2 and −q/2 respectively,
such that F((x,m)|x ∈ w)=F((x,m)|x ∈ w0)=0 , then there exist λ ∈
(0,1) such that for any πt / ∈ (λ,1 − λ), r(At,πt)=1 .
26Diamond and Verrechia de￿ne the speed of convergence to the true value of the asset
by the expected length of time needed for the process Lt to cross a given threshold.




Proof: We prove Lemma 4 considering buy orders. Similar argument ap-
plies for sell orders and no trade.
P r o o fo fr e s u l t1 :T a k eAt = buy,t h e n
Pr(At |V = V,H t)=pF(Φ(π
h









t,A t)) + (1 − p)F(Φ(πl
t,A t))
(1 − p)F(Φ(πh
t,A t)) + pF(Φ(πl
t,A t))
. (10)
Now, remark that r(At,πt) reaches its minimum for F(Φ(πh
t,A t)) = 0
and F(Φ(πl
t,A t)) = 1 and reaches its maximum for F(Φ(πh
t,A t)) = 1 and
F(Φ(πl





note that if traders were risk neutral, then r(At,π t) would be equal to
p
1−p.
This proves that the presence of risk averse informed traders reduces the
informative content of buy orders.
Proof of result 2: The sketch of the proof is as follows. If the distribution
of the traders￿ portfolios is bounded away from
q
2 and from −
q
2 then, for any
belief πt suﬃciently close to 1 or 0, any trader acts no matter the private
signal. This implies At = Bt = v(πt) which in turn implies r(At,π t)=1 .
We now give the formal proof. By assumption there exists δ>0 such that
Pr
¡








2,m)=V , we deduce that
it exists ηδ > 0 such that almost surely for any x, β(1,x,m) / ∈ (V −ηδ,V +ηδ).
Taking advantage from the continuity of β with respect to π, we deduce that
there exist λβ > 0 such that for any π in (1−λβ,1), almost surely for any x,
β(π,x,m) / ∈ (V −ηδ,V +ηδ). This implies either β(πh,x,m) and β(πl,x,m)
are lower than V −ηδ either β(πh,x,m) and β(πl,x,m) are larger than V +ηδ.
Now, recall that v(1) = V and v(πl
t) <A t <v (πh
t).T h u s ,ηδ can be chosen
such that At ∈ (V − ηδ,V + ηδ). This implies, for almost surely any x,n o
matter their signal, traders either decide not to buy, either decide to buy.
Thus traders￿ actions are not informative and so At = v(πt).
In a similar way it is possible to ￿nd λ
0
β ∈ (0,1) and λα ∈ (0,1),s u c h
that buy orders are not informative when πt <λ
0
β and sell orders are
28not informative when πt / ∈ (λα,1 − λα).T h e n i t i s s u ﬃcient to choose
λ =m i n {λβ,λ
0
β,λ α}.
P r o o fo fr e s u l t3 :T a k eAt = buy. It can be easily checked that F(Φ(π,A))
is not increasing in A. Indeed, all the agents that are willing to buy the
asset at price A will also buy at price A0 <A . And so for any given level
of prior π, the probability of observing a buy order does not increase with
the price at which market makers sell. Moreover, from lemma 2 we know
that vl(πt) ≤ At ≤ vh(πt). Thus, considering expression (10), the quantity














Moreover, from Lemma 1 and the continuity of F,w ed e d u c et h a tw h e n





This proves result 3).¥
P r o o fo fl e m m a3 : When trader￿s inventories are discretely distributed,
conditions (5) and (6) state that qb and qs should be chosen such that the
probability of observing trades from agents whose inventory is equal to qs/2
or −qb/2 is maximized. Indeed, for πt suﬃciently close to 1 or to 0, it results
that r(A,π t), the informative content of sell (resp. buy) orders is close to
r(sell,πt)=
F(Ψ(πt)) + Pr(x = qs/2))(1 − p)
F(Ψ(πt)) + Pr(x = qs/2))p
,
resp. r(buy,πt)=
F(Φ(πt)) + Pr(x = −qs/2))p
F(Φ(πt)) + Pr(x = −qs/2))(1 − p)
where Ψ(πt)={(x,m)| trader sells no matter his signal, given Ht}, Φ(πt)=
{(x,m)| trader buys no matter his signal, given Ht}.T h e r e f o r et h es p e e do f
convergence of beliefs to the truth will be maximized by choosing
qs =m a x
q Pr(x = q/2)),
qb =m a x
q Pr(−q/2).
29¥
Proof of proposition 4: Remark that similarly to the case where the size of
trade is ￿xed, the informativeness of a trade Ai ∈ {−Nδ,...,−δ,0,δ,...,Nδ}
can be measured by the ratio r(Ai,πi)=
Pr(Ai |V =V, H i)
Pr(Ai |V =V ,Hi). We follow the
same method used for the proof of proposition 3: Proposition 4 is a direct
consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 5: Under assumption 1, if traders can buy and sell round lots of







2) If for any n ∈ {−N,−N +1 ,...N} there exist wn neighborhoods of
q(n + 1
2),s u c ht h a tF((x,m)|x ∈ wn)=0 , then there exist λ>0 such that
for any πt / ∈ (λ,1 − λ), r(At,πt)=1 .




P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :The proof of result 1 is the same than the proof of
result 1 in lemma 4.
In order to prove result 2 consider a trader with belief π and portfolio
(x,m),w ed e n o t ew i t hz(π,x,m,P) ∈ R his excess demand for the risky
asset when he can trade any quantity at price P:
z =a r gm a x
D∈R
E[u(v(x + D)+m − PD)].
Note that as u is strictly concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable z(.)
is continuous in all its arguments. Result 2 relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 6: If π is 0 or 1, then i) z(π,x,m,v(π)) = −x; ii) a trader is
indiﬀerent between buying (selling) nq or (n+1)q risky assets at price v(π)
if and only if x = −q(n + 1
2) (resp. x = q(n + 1
2)).
Proof:W ep r o v i d et h ep r o o ff o rπ =0 .T h e p r o o f f o r π =1uses the
same arguments. If π =0 ,t h e nv(0) = V and
z(π,x,m,v(π)) = argmax
D∈R
E[u((V + ε)(x + D)+m − V D]
30and so, z(0,x,m,V)=−x follows from the concavity of u and the symmetry
of the distribution of ε. To prove assertion (ii), consider W = V x+m+ε(x+
nq) and W∗ = V x+m+ε(x+(n+1)q) and note that for x = −q(n+1/2)
we have W = V x + m − εq/2 and W∗= V x + m + εq/2. Observing that ε
is symmetrically distributed with mean 0 it follows E[u(W∗)] = E[u(W)].
Thus, result ii).¥
Now, in order to prove result 2 in lemma 5, it is suﬃcient to show that
when πt i sc l o s et o0o rt o1 ,i n f o r m e dt r a d e r ￿ so r d e r sd on o td e p e n do nt h e i r
private signal. Notice ￿r s tt h a ta sl o n ga sp ∈ (1/2,1),w h e nπt is suﬃciently
close to 1 or 0 an informative signal aﬀects slightly the informed trader belief,
i.e. limπt→1(πh
t −πl
t)=l i m πt→0(πh
t −πl
t)=0 . From the continuity of traders￿
demand in the belief π,w eh a v et h a tf o rπt suﬃciently close to 1 or 0,i t






Thus, for πt suﬃciently close to 1 or 0, an order coming from a informed
trader changes with his signal only if before receiving the signal the trader
was almost indiﬀerent between trading nq or (n +1 ) q for some n ∈ N.T h i s
is because the discreteness in the set of informed traders actions. However,
from lemma 6, if πt is suﬃciently close to 1 or 0 then a trader is indiﬀerent
between trading nq or (n +1 ) q only if his inventory x is suﬃciently close to
q(n + 1
2) or −q(n + 1
2). That never happens under the assumption we made
on F(.).
Given result 2, the proof of result 3 is equivalent to the proof of result 3 in
lemma 4: as long as πt approaches 0 or 1 the proportion of informative trade
shirks reducing the speed of convergence of the public belief to the truth. ¥
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V< C < V   = 0 ; θ  = 1
1
V
π * π **
V
Figure 1: Traders￿ orders are informative as long as πt ∈ (π∗,π∗∗).W h e n















































Figure 2: When C =0and θ =1 , and a traders receive a signal s = h
(s = l), his valuation for the object is equal to the ask price (resp. bid price)
no matter the past history of trade. Thus, traders￿ actions always re￿ect the









Case (i),    proposition 1
1
V
π * π **
V
Figure 3: Traders￿ orders are informative as long as πt ∈ (π∗,π∗∗).W h e n
a negative history is observed and πt <π ∗, all traders￿ valuation are lower
than the bid price and sell herding starts. Note that public posterior beliefs
stop to evolve, consequently ask and bid prices are identical and linear in πt.






Bid and ask 




π * π **
Figure 4: When the initial prior is between π∗ and π∗∗,a ni n f o r m e dt r a d e r
buys if and only if he receives a bullish signal and he does not trade if his
signal is bearish. However an informed trader always buys when πt <π ∗
or πt >π ∗∗. It follows that, if π0 ∈ (π∗,π ∗∗) a sequence of buy orders can
prime buy herding behavior, while a sequence of no-trade can trigger buy
contrarian behavior.
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